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on imports to the United States from developed economies, this paper investigates 
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 TRADE COSTS AND SOME PUZZLES IN INTERNATIONAL 
MACROECONOMICS 
Luke Willard 
1.  Introduction 
The international macroeconomics literature has identified a number of key 
puzzles which are associated with empirical correlations. One, called the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle, is why domestic investment is correlated with domestic saving 
when, in a world with open capital markets, savings should flow to countries with 
the greatest investment opportunities. For example, in the sample of developed 
economies used in this paper, there is a correlation between annual investment and 
saving of 0.47 when theory would predict a low correlation.1 Another, called the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) puzzle, is why the real exchange rate is very 
persistent despite the relative flexibility implied by high nominal exchange rate 
volatility.2 For example, Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996) find that it 
takes over three years for a deviation from PPP to be reduced by one-half in 
developed economies. A third puzzle, called the international consumption 
correlation puzzle, is why, in a world of international trade and capital flows, 
financial instruments (or other mechanisms) have not developed so as to better 
help consumption smoothing in the face of country-specific shocks. Some theories 
suggest that countries should smooth consumption such that every country’s 
consumption is perfectly correlated with world consumption.3 
                                           
1  This puzzle was originally described by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). More recent work by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Feldstein (2005) suggests that the extent of the puzzle has 
lessened but the puzzle is still important. The correlations in Table 1 suggest that the extent of 
the correlation has fallen from about 0.6 to 0.3. 
2  Taylor (2000) argues that it is generally difficult to test for deviations from PPP. Even if one 
is uncomfortable characterising the correlations discussed in this paper as puzzles, it is useful 
to know the extent to which they can be accounted for by trade costs for the purposes of better 
understanding and predicting economic developments. 
3  For example, see the discussion in Chapter 6 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). In this paper,  
I put aside concerns that have been raised about how the low consumption correlation is only 
a puzzle under a set of strong assumptions (such as that the amount of leisure does not affect 
the marginal utility of consumption), as a number of these assumptions are fairly standard in 
the macroeconomic literature. 2 
In a seminal paper in international macroeconomics, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) 
argue that trade costs could explain these puzzles (as well as some other puzzles, 
such as the extent of the bias towards consuming domestically produced goods and 
the bias towards domestic shares in equity portfolios). While trade costs provide a 
natural explanation for why individuals consume a relatively high share of 
domestically produced goods, this paper seeks to assess the extent to which the 
data suggest that trade costs can explain the Feldstein-Horioka, PPP and 
international consumption correlation puzzles. In essence, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
suggest that trade costs for goods can cause phenomena that are similar to financial 
market imperfections, which are natural explanations for both the Feldstein-
Horioka and consumption correlation puzzles.4 With financial market 
imperfections, global savings do not necessarily flow to the most profitable 
investments, which would explain the high correlation of domestic investment and 
saving. Similarly, financial market imperfections due to trade costs may also lessen 
the extent of consumption smoothing across countries. Trade costs also explain 
why the same good may not cost the same amount in different countries and so 
provides a natural explanation of deviations from PPP (see the discussion in 
Dumas 1992).5 
The contribution of this paper is to assess the plausibility of the trade-cost 
explanation for these three puzzles within a simple empirical analysis which is 
consistently applied across each of the puzzles. Some existing literature looks at 
whether trade costs can explain the potentially related puzzle of the home bias in 
portfolio holdings (Coeurdacier 2006 and van Wincoop and Warnock 2006). Other 
work has found evidence between the home bias in portfolio holdings and the 
international consumption correlation puzzle (Sørensen et al 2005). Other related 
literature looks at the channels of consumption smoothing such as the role of 
government spending (Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha 1996, for example). 
                                           
4  Trade costs imply that a country’s consumption patterns can affect prices, and, therefore, 
expected changes in consumption patterns can affect interest rates. Trade costs can also affect 
incentives for portfolio diversification and the ability to share risks internationally since 
payments to foreigners can only be made in the form of traded goods. Fazio, MacDonald and 
Melitz (2005) also suggest that trade costs can explain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle because 
of the differential between consumption and output prices. 
5  Some of the controls used later in the panel data regressions could be viewed as ways of 
trying to control for other possible explanations of the puzzles. This is particularly relevant for 
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle for which a number of explanations already exist (though 
Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001 describe them as not thoroughly convincing). 
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The extent to which trade costs might explain these three puzzles in 
macroeconomics is interesting in a number of respects. It would aid in the 
prediction and interpretation of movements in the real exchange rate, investment 
and consumption. For example, if trade costs play a role in these puzzles and 
continue to decline, it would be expected that real exchange rates would tend to 
adjust to shocks more quickly, domestic investment and saving would become less 
closely related and consumption would become smoother (at least to the extent of 
not responding to domestic shocks). It is also likely to change the way in which 
shocks that influence the real exchange rate influence the rest of the economy.6 
Perhaps as importantly, if there is evidence that trade costs explain the 
consumption correlation puzzle, it would suggest that lower trade costs may not 
only raise welfare by enabling greater opportunities to benefit from comparative 
advantage, but also by facilitating consumption smoothing. Similarly, if trade costs 
explain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, it suggests that lowering trading costs will 
help saving flow to where investment returns are higher. 
To preview the results, I find some evidence that trade costs appear to play a role 
in each of the three puzzles for the developed economies in the sample, though 
sometimes the relationships are imprecisely estimated and trade costs appear to 
only explain certain aspects of the correlations (which are indicative of the 
puzzles). Figure 1 summarises these results. The horizontal axes show a measure 
of trade costs for each country’s imports into the US. The trade costs are expressed 
as a percentage of the free-alongside-ship (FAS) cost. FAS cost is closely related 
to the more commonly cited free-on-board (FOB) cost, which includes loading 
costs. On the vertical axis, the top panel of Figure 1 plots a measure of the 
correlation between investment and saving for each country (obtained by 
regressing investment on saving, both as a percentage of GDP). The positive 
relationship suggests that lower trade costs are associated with a smaller Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle (a lower correlation between investment and saving). The middle 
panel of Figure 1 plots trade costs against a measure of real exchange rate 
persistence within each country – based on the coefficient of regressing the real 
exchange rate on the first period lag of the exchange rate. The bottom panel of 
Figure 1 plots trade costs against a measure of the correlation between domestic 
                                           
6  Also, if the real exchange rate becomes less persistent it may be easier to determine what 
drives real exchange rate movements (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). 
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output and consumption.7 These positive relationships support Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s (1996) theory. Later it will be argued that trade costs play an 
economically significant role in explaining the Feldstein-Horioka and PPP puzzles. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The main empirical methods used are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data and the main results. Some 
results examining whether capital restrictions play a role are presented in   
Section 4. Section 5 presents results using an alternative measure of trade costs and 
provides some additional checks of robustness. Section 6 discusses in more detail 
those aspects of the correlations which trade costs appear to be able to explain. 
Brief conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
                                           
7  The regressions estimated for Figure 1 are the equivalent of Equations (1), (3) and (4) below 
without the trade-cost terms and with a constant instead of the fixed effects. 
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2.  Method and Data 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) present a series of simple models in which a 
percentage of the good is lost in transport to argue that trade costs can explain 
these three puzzles. The estimation approach used in this paper uses panel data 
(across countries and time) to examine the link between trade costs and various 
measures of the extent of these puzzles (for example, a higher correlation between 
saving and investment for the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle). 
The approach involves running regressions similar to those seen in the existing 
literature about these puzzles, but also including terms relating to trade costs, 
which are proxied by cost data based on US imports. These data are used because, 
firstly, it seems to be close to what Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model suggests is most 
relevant (costs that cause a wedge between prices faced by locals and foreigners).8 
Secondly, it is one of the few reliable sources for trade costs (Hummels and 
Lugovskyy 2006).9 
To examine whether trade costs play a role in the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, 
variations of the following regression are run on data from 1974–2001: 














1 1 1 1 1 + + + + = θ γ φ δ  (1) 
                                           
8  Plausibly, other factors affecting prices faced by foreigners (compared to locals) – such as 
non-tariff barriers and intranational transportation costs – are positively correlated with the 
measure used. To the extent that they are uncorrelated, the coefficients estimated may be 
biased towards zero and may explain the insignificance of some of the statistical results 
below. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a rich discussion of issues relating to trade 
costs such as their measurement. 
9  Analysis of the 1999 data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) confirms that 
these statistics are not a reliable source from which to infer trade costs. In particular, it is not 
uncommon for the cost insurance and freight (CIF) measure of trade to be less than the FOB 
measure of the same trade flow, implying a negative trade-weighted trade cost for some 
countries (even after adding 10 per cent to costs for Australia and Canada, where imports are 
reported FOB rather than CIF). As the US is the most significant economy in the world, it 
seems reasonable to think that US costs are likely to be a reasonable proxy for costs applying 
to a significant portion of world trade. This issue will be discussed further below. 
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where: t is a year index; i is a country index; I is investment; S is saving; and Y is 
output. f captures the average transport costs for shipments originating in country i 
to the US in year t (using data on US merchandise imports from Feenstra 2005).  
f is defined as the average percentage trade cost including insurance, derived as 
CIF (cost, insurance and freight) plus duties minus the FAS value (all expressed as 
a percentage of the FAS value). Results are also reported for measures excluding 
duties. Apart from the Feenstra trade data, much of the data used in the analysis 
comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators. This source provides 
a reasonably standardised collection of cross-country data. However, as with all 
cross-country data sets, there are likely to be concerns about the reliability of the 
data and their comparability across countries. The inclusion of fixed effects can be 
viewed as a way of controlling for some of these cross-country differences. A 
summary of the key data is provided in Table 1; details about the data and how the 
variables are defined are provided in Appendix A.10 
In short, the regression describes investment as depending upon: (a) country fixed 
effects (to capture potentially relevant factors that may be relatively invariant over 
time); (b) saving; (c) saving interacted with trade costs (to allow for the 
investment-saving relationship to vary with trade costs); and (d) trade costs (as 
trade costs may be associated with lower investment). 
If trade costs provide at least a partial explanation of the puzzle, γ1 would be 
expected to be positive. If γ1 is positive and  1 φ  is not statistically different from 
zero, the results could be interpreted as suggesting that trade costs explain all of the 
puzzle. However there are a number of reasons why this is unlikely. For example, 
in real business cycle models with complete markets and no trade costs, shocks can 
lead to a co-movement of investment and saving. Some of the results in Kehoe and 
Perri (2002) seem consistent with this.11 
                                           
10 The regressions are generally estimated with dummies using least squares. This will yield 
reliable estimates if the number of countries is sufficiently large, which I am assuming is  
true here. 
11 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, ch 3) provide additional reasons why trade costs may explain 
only part of the puzzle. However, the regression results below may, to some extent, control 
for these other potential explanations of the puzzle, like demographic change, via decade 
fixed effects. 
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One possible concern about estimating a regression like Equation (1) is that with 
the country fixed effects, the parameters of interest (for example, γ1 and  1 φ  ) are 
estimated from a small fraction of the variation in the independent variable (in this 
case, investment). There is some evidence that this is true.12 To some extent, the 
issue is that there is a trade-off between estimating with fewer fixed effects (such 
as estimating with just country fixed effects) and estimating with more fixed 
effects (such as with country-decade fixed effects). The former approach may 
reduce the extent of multicollinearity and is likely to be more informative as it 
estimates fewer parameters from the same number of observations (assuming the 
equations are not misspecified). The latter is likely to be more immune from 
arguments that other factors not included in the regression could explain the 
apparent correlation between investment and saving. 
I also compare the results from estimating Equation (1) to the regression excluding 
the interaction and trade-cost terms. If trade costs can account for much of the 
puzzle, the coefficient on investment should be much smaller in a regression of 
Equation (1) than in the regression without trade-cost terms. 
For the purchasing PPP, variations of the following regressions are estimated: 
  it it it it it it e f f RER RER RER 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 ) log( ) log( ) log( + + + + = − − θ γ φ δ  (2) 
  it it it it it it e f f RER RER RER 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 + + + + = − − θ γ φ δ  (3) 
                                           
12 The concern is that there is a close-to-linear relationship between the main variables of 
interest (for example, saving interacted with trade costs) and the other right-hand-side 
variables. A fair amount of this multicollinearity is due to the relationship between the 
interaction term and trade costs. As discussed in Deaton (1997), a concern could be that 
including fixed effects (and other controls) increases the noise-to-signal ratio in the 
independent variable of interest, potentially making the estimates appear insignificant even if 
the underlying relationship between trade costs and the puzzle is important. The 
insignificance of some coefficients is consistent with this. 
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where  RER is a real exchange rate index. Here, country fixed effects are not 
included because to do so in the presence of a lagged dependent variable would 
result in biased estimates.13 
If trade costs are a contributor to the PPP puzzle, the coefficient on the third term, 
2 γ , is expected to be positive, indicating that higher trade costs increase the 
persistence of the real exchange rate and decrease the speed of convergence. The 
model is estimated in both logs, Equation (2), and levels, Equation (3). The former 
has the advantage of reducing the influence of some observations that are extreme, 
which may be due to the real exchange rate being poorly measured.14 
To examine the effect of trade costs on the international consumption correlation 
puzzle, variations of the following regression are estimated: 




















log( + + + + = θ γ φ δ  (4) 
where: C and GDP are consumption and output per capita; and C* and GDP* are 
world consumption and output per capita (in real US dollars).15 Under a simple 
model of complete insurance, the growth rate of every individual’s consumption 
could be expected to be equal. In this case, the growth rate of national consumption 
per capita should equal the growth rate of world consumption per capita; 
                                           
13 As mentioned previously, Taylor (2000) has discussed how this type of regression is not 
necessarily inconsistent with PPP. However, a number of authors, including Imbs   
et al (2005), estimate a linear model similar to Equation (2) and treat the coefficient on the 
first lag of the exchange rate as indicative of the extent of the PPP puzzle. Even if this is not 
informative about the PPP puzzle, the results indicate the persistence of the real exchange 
rate. As the real effective exchange rate is arguably the most relevant for developments in the 
economy, it is the focus of the analysis, though some robustness checks are done with 
bilateral real exchange rates. 
14 An alternative approach could be to include trade-cost terms in some of the popular non-linear 
models such as Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive (often referred to as ESTAR; 
see, for example, Kilian and Taylor 2001). Kilian and Taylor’s results provide mixed 
evidence of whether trade (which is likely to be related to trade costs) explains the speed of 
adjustment. Countries for which shocks to the real exchange rate have relatively short half-
lives (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) trade less, considering the size of 
their economy, than two of the other economies in the sample (Canada and Switzerland), but 
more than the only other country in the sample (Japan). 
15 This specification is similar in spirit to the one in Sørensen et al (2005). 
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alternatively, the ratio of national consumption per capita and world consumption 
per capita should be constant.16 So, if there is no consumption correlation puzzle 
(that is, there is complete risk sharing), all terms in Equation (4) except the country 
fixed effects should have coefficients which are equal to zero. Alternatively, with 
no risk sharing, consumption should move in line with national income (or output). 
If trade costs explain all of the puzzle, the coefficient on the third term should be 
positive and the coefficient on the second term should be zero. 
I also estimate a version using consumption and output measured in PPP terms. 
Such PPP measures may be more appropriate as they value goods according to 
common international prices, however, there is no readily available measure of 
world output on this basis, so I include year fixed effects in order to capture the 
effect of these omitted terms. 
One potential concern with estimating Equation (4) is that it ignores the possibility 
that the consumption puzzle is explained by consumption of non-tradable goods 
like housing. There is some evidence that non-tradables can explain the 
consumption correlation puzzle (Lewis 1996). Partly due to data availability and 
partly to examine how much of the puzzle can be explained by trade costs alone, 
my analysis does not take into account the role of non-tradables. 
3.  Main Results 
Table 1 indicates that trade costs have tended to decline over time and there is 
substantial variation in trade costs across countries. The level and trends in average 
trade costs are broadly consistent with other studies, which also imply that trade 
costs have declined at least since the 1980s (see, for example, Hummels 1999). 
 
                                           
16 In an economy with a fixed population, where all individuals have identical preferences with 
constant relative risk aversion, each individual will consume a constant share of world 
consumption each period (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). This implies that individual 
consumption growth will be the same across individuals in each time period. Hence, national 
per capita consumption growth should equal world per capita consumption growth. The 
specification of Equation (4) has been driven by a desire to use a similar regression to that of 
Equations (1) to (3), while being similar to previous statistical examinations of the extent of 
complete insurance (for example, Townsend 1994, chapter 5 of Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996 and 
Sørensen et al 2005). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 1974–1981  1982–1991  1992–2001 
Trade costs (CIF compared to FAS) (per cent)       
 Average  7  6  4 
 Standard  deviation  3  2  2 
 Maximum  16  13  10 
 Minimum  2  1  0 
Trade costs (also including duties) (per cent)       
 Average  12  9  6 
 Standard  deviation  5  3  3 
 Maximum  57  16  14 
 Minimum  4  2  1 
Other variables       
  Investment (per cent of GDP) average  26  23  21 
 Standard  deviation  4  4  3 
  Saving (per cent of GDP) average  24  23  23 
 Standard  deviation  5  4  5 
  Ln(output/output world) average  1.3  1.4  1.4 
 Standard  deviation  0.4  0.4  0.4 
  Ln(cons/cons world) average  1.3  1.4  1.4 
 Standard  deviation  0.3  0.4  0.3 
 Ln(GDP(PWT))  average  9.6  9.8  10.0 
 Standard  deviation  0.2  0.2  0.2 
 Ln(consumption(PWT)*100)  average  13.7  13.8  14.0 
 Standard  deviation  0.2  0.2  0.2 
 Capital  controls  average  0.8  0.6  0.1 
  Investment and saving correlation  0.58  0.63  0.30 
  Real exchange rate and one year lag correlation  0.85  0.94  0.80 
  Consumption and output regression coefficient  0.84  0.79  0.64 
Notes:  These are summary statistics where each observation is country-year. There are 168 observations on trade 
costs for 1974–1981, 210 for 1982–1991 and 210 for 1992–2001. The number of observations used for 
calculating the investment and real exchange rate correlations are: 168 and 116, respectively, for 
1974–1981; 210 for 1982–1991; and 210 for 1992–2001. Note that as the subsequent regression 
analysis includes a constant, using Ln(Consumption(PWT)*100) will be equivalent to using 
Ln(Consumption(PWT)). PWT indicates the Penn World Table per capita PPP data. The last row reports 
results controlling for country fixed effects. 
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Also there is some evidence that the investment-saving correlation and the strength 
of the consumption-output correlation have both decreased over time, consistent 
with trade costs falling. 
3.1  Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
Table 2 reports the estimates for the investment equation. Each row reports the 
coefficients from a single regression; results for a wide variety of specifications 
and samples are reported, providing evidence of the robustness of the results. 
Proceeding from the top of Table 2, I first report the two regressions that are the 
focus of my analysis. The first regression estimates Equation (1) with trade-cost 
terms (including duties), while the second regression excludes trade costs. With 
trade costs, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant though the 
saving coefficient is not zero, suggesting that trade costs are only a partial 
explanation of the puzzle. The extent to which trade costs can account for the 
puzzle is indicated by the lower coefficient on saving in the model with trade costs 
compared to the coefficient without (0.19 versus 0.44). Though it is of less interest, 
the coefficient on trade costs is negative and significant.17 
Results for a variety of reasonable alternative specifications are as follows. The 
third and fourth regressions include country-decade fixed effects (which can lead 
to better estimates if it is believed that the relationship between investment and 
saving may vary within the same country over time, say, because of productivity 
shocks). As the theory only describes trade costs in a simple way, it is reassuring 
that the results estimated using this regression are similar to those in the first two 
rows. The fifth row reports the results where the trade-cost measure does not 
include duties. The results are similar to the first row. 
                                           
17 For a number of the regressions estimated in this paper, I allowed for serial correlation of the 
errors by estimating Newey-West standard errors. However, they led to similar results and so 
are not reported. 
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Table 2: Investment – Equation (1) 
Model with country fixed effects 
 Trade-cost 
measure 










































6  With duties  Weighted by 
population 
0.56 0.006 0.22 
7  With duties  Weighted by GDP  0.63  –0.002  0.42 

























































Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 588 observations used to estimate the 
results in the first row. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. ‘na’ signifies no available 
estimate either because the terms are not included in the regression or because the variable is co-linear 
with the fixed effects. 
  (a) Additional control is log distance interacted with the main independent variable (here, saving). 
  (b) Calculated using Stata’s rreg command. 
  (c) According to Stock-Yogo critical values, the instruments are not weak. 
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The sixth and seventh regressions estimate Equation (1), but weighted by 
population and GDP (which could reduce measurement error problems and may be 
more appropriate if one is more interested in the result among larger, more 
populated economies).18 These results provide weaker evidence that trade costs 
play a role in the puzzle. 
The eighth regression is estimated with log distance (from the US) interacted with 
saving (the main independent variable) included in the regression, as well as the 
standard monetary measure of trade costs. This is designed to examine whether the 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables that may measure trade costs 
(at least with the largest economy in the world). One motivation for including this 
variable is to examine whether the main trade-cost variable may be picking up the 
effects of trade costs specific to the US. It is notable that the monetary trade cost-
saving interaction term remains positive and significant (suggesting monetary trade 
costs play a role). However, the coefficient on saving becomes larger (though it is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero). This regression suggests that once a rich 
enough set of trade-cost measures are included, the positive correlation between 
saving and investment disappears. 
The ninth regression reports the results using a robust regression procedure which 
seeks to downplay the role of potential outliers. This regression has similar results 
to the baseline specification, though the coefficient on saving is larger. Rows 10 
and 11 report the results of using average trade costs over the sample as the 
measure of trade costs. This could help eliminate measurement error and so may 
yield better estimates. Consistent with this, the estimate on the interaction term is 
larger in this specification, at least compared to the baseline specification. 
The twelfth row reports the results using instrumental variables (IV), where the 
lagged trade costs are used as an instrument. IV estimation is motivated by the 
trade-cost measure providing a noisy measure of the actual trade cost. Using an 
instrument (that is, lagged trade costs) can potentially resolve this problem by 
                                           
18 For all regression results using weighting, I have used Stata’s pweight option. This reweights 
assuming that the weight is the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due 
to sampling design. For the point estimates, the results seem robust to the reweighting method 
used. I have not reported standard errors as the results are sensitive to the weighting method 
used and the most appropriate method is debatable. 
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essentially providing a better measure of trade costs (see Hayashi 2000, ch 3).19 
However, the standard errors are large (as is common with IV estimation), 
suggesting that this method does not provide very informative results. The 
thirteenth row reports results using an alternative measure of investment (using 
gross fixed capital formation instead of gross capital formation). The fourteenth 
row reports results with demographic and productivity controls (proxied by GDP 
growth).20 The latter is motivated by Taylor (1994), who finds evidence that 
demographic and productivity changes account for some of the puzzle, consistent 
with demographic and productivity changes affecting both investment and saving. 
In summary, the regression results in Table 2 generally suggest that there is 
evidence that increased trade costs are associated with a larger correlation between 
investment and saving (as indicated by the tendency for the coefficient on the 
interaction term to be positive and significant). Even so, trade costs can explain 
some, but not all, of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, since the coefficient on saving 
tends to be typically lower in the model with transaction costs than the one 
without, though it remains positive and significant. 
3.2  PPP Puzzle 
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates from a similar set of regressions with the real 
exchange rate as the dependent variable and the lagged exchange rate as the main 
independent variable. They show that the coefficient for the trade-cost interaction 
term is of the correct sign (positive), though it is typically insignificant. The 
negative coefficient on the trade-cost term suggests that countries with higher trade 
costs have lower real exchange rates (perhaps consistent with a need to have a 
more competitive exchange rate to compensate for higher trade costs). It is 
                                           
19 Using IV assumes that noise in the instrument, lagged trade cost, is uncorrelated with the 
noise in the regressor, current trade costs, which seems plausible. 
20 Unlike Taylor (1994), relative prices are not included as controls as they may be related to the 
relative prices faced by locals and foreigners. 
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noticeable that the lagged real exchange rate coefficient is somewhat smaller 
compared to models without trade costs.21 
The last three rows of Table 4 present results that use some alternative estimation 
methods and/or data that have been used in the existing literature. Specifically, row 
14 reports results controlling for country fixed effects. Row 15 uses bilateral 
monthly real exchange rate data between the US and some European countries 
where prices are particular sub-components of the CPI index. This is designed to 
address the concern that the PPP puzzle is an artefact of using aggregated prices 
(see Imbs et al 2005).22 The data for this come from Imbs’ website. The last row 
uses monthly bilateral real exchange rates with the US. These last three rows 
suggest that the exchange rate is highly persistent and do not suggest a role for 





                                           
21 There is mixed evidence on time-series properties of the main economic series, but there are 
some theoretical reasons for thinking they may be stationary and hence the regression results 
being informative. In the context of Tables 3 and 4, a potential concern is that the real 
exchange rate may have a unit root. The existing literature suggests that it is difficult to 
distinguish between a unit root and a persistent stationary process and that, using very long 
runs of data, there is evidence that real exchange rates are stationary (see discussion in 
Schnatz 2006). Also, if the real exchange rate does have a unit root, then it suggests that it is 
not mean-reverting, which seems at odds with the characterisation of the puzzle – that the 
exchange rate just takes longer than expected but does revert to the mean. Potentially, some of 
the investment and consumption regressions I conduct could be viewed as robustness checks 
in case my baseline regressions are misleading due to the time series being non-stationary. 
22 The results are estimated using the mean group estimator used by Imbs et al (2005) and 
discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995), which allows for country fixed effects. The use of 
country fixed effects is likely to be less problematic for rows 15 and 16 as they use monthly 
and quarterly data, which are more frequent. 
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Table 3: Real Exchange Rate – Levels Equation (3) 
Model with no fixed effects 
  Trade-cost 
measure 












2  Without trade 
costs 
Baseline specification  0.86* 
(0.03) 
na na 






4  Without trade 
costs 
Decade fixed effects  0.86* 
(0.03) 
na na 






6  With duties  Weighted by population  0.73  0.02  –1.93 
7  With duties  Weighted by GDP  0.68  0.03  –2.58 
8  With duties  With additional control






9  With duties  Robust regression






















12  With duties  With four lags of first 







Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 536 observations used to estimate the 
results in the first row. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. ‘na’ signifies no available 
estimate either because the terms are not included in the regression or because the variable is co-linear 
with the fixed effects. 
  (a) Additional control is log distance interacted with the main independent variable. 






Table 4: Real Exchange Rate – Logs Equation (2) 















2 Without  trade 
costs 
Baseline specification  0.88* 
(0.03) 
na na 






4 Without  trade 
costs 
Decade fixed effects  0.88* 
(0.03) 
na na 






6  With duties  Weighted by population  0.69  0.02  –0.11 
7  With duties  Weighted by GDP  0.62  0.03  –0.14 














10  No duties  Trade cost average  







11  With duties  Trade cost average  
















13  With duties  With four lags of first difference 







14  With duties  Estimated in first  









15  With duties  Using Imbs et al monthly data  0.96  –0.001  0.0009 
16  With duties  Using quarterly bilateral data 







Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 536 observations used to estimate the 
results in the first row. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. ‘na’ signifies no available 
estimate either because the terms are not included in the regression or because the variable is co-linear 
with the fixed effects. 
  (a) Additional control is log distance interacted with the main independent variable. 
(b) Calculated using Stata’s rreg command. 
(c) Based on Stock-Yogo critical values, the instruments are not weak. 
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3.3  International Consumption Correlation Puzzle 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide evidence about whether trade costs play a role in the 
international consumption correlation puzzle. The first two tables use data 
calculated using exchange rate measures (with consumption including government 
spending). Table 5 uses only country fixed effects (that is, it estimates   
Equation (4), the preferred specification), while Table 6 includes decade-country 
interactions. Both Tables 5 and 6 report a set of results based on consumption 
including the statistical discrepancy in case some hard-to-estimate components of 
consumption are in the discrepancy. Also, in rows 14 and 15 of Table 5, results are 
reported using consumption (excluding government spending) and including 
demographic controls. The last regression is similar to Townsend (1994), which 
includes demographic controls. The results from these regressions can be viewed 
as further robustness checks. 
Table 7 is based on PPP data (with consumption excluding government spending). 
Rather than using measures of world output and consumption (which are included 
in Equation (4)), it includes year fixed effects to capture these omitted variables. In 
some sense this specification could be viewed as allowing for a weaker form of 
global risk sharing. For example, it may be that there is perfect risk sharing among 
OECD countries (rather than the world as a whole), in which case these regressions 
should find an interaction term that is equal to zero. Rows 11 and 12 include 
results with consumption including government spending and demographic 
controls respectively.23 
Tables 5–7 generally report an interaction coefficient which is positive, though 
often insignificant. In general, the introduction of trade-cost terms do not 
substantially change the size of the coefficient on the output term, suggesting that 
trade costs do not play a big part in the consumption correlation puzzle. This might 
be because non-tradables lead to a correlation between domestic consumption and 
output. The estimates for the interactive coefficient using trade costs averaged over 
the whole sample (which may eliminate measurement error) tend to be positive, 
significant and are often larger than the estimates obtained using other regressions. 
                                           
23 Row 13 of Table 5 reports the results of running a regression similar to those reported in 
Table 7 (that is, a regression of log consumption per capita on log output per capita with year 
and country fixed effects). 
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Table 5: Consumption – Equation (4) 
Exchange rate measure (including government spending) – country fixed effects 
 Trade-cost 
measure 










2 Without  trade 
costs 
Baseline specification  0.70* 
(0.03) 
na na 














5  With duties  Weighted by population  0.86  –0.0005  –0.0025 
6  With duties  Weighted by GDP  0.83  –0.0029  0.0000 







8 With  duties Robust regression





































13  With duties  Year dummies and 
























Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 588 observations used to estimate the 
results in the first row. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. ‘na’ signifies no available 
estimate either because the terms are not included in the regression or because the variable is co-linear 
with the fixed effects. 
  (a) Additional control is log distance interacted with the main independent variable. 
  (b) Calculated using Stata’s rreg command. 
  (c) Based on Stock-Yogo critical values, the instruments are not weak. 
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Table 6: Consumption – Equation (4) 
Exchange rate measure (including government spending) –  
decade-country fixed effects 
 Trade-cost 
measure 










2 Without  trade 
costs 
Baseline specification   0.72* 
(0.03) 
na na 














Notes:   Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. ‘na’
signifies no available estimate either because the terms are not included in the regression or because the 
variable is co-linear with the fixed effects. There are 588 observations used to estimate the results in the 
first row. 
 
Also, it can be seen from the results reported in Tables 5 and 7 that the results are 
generally not sensitive to whether consumption includes government spending or 
not. This suggests that government spending does not play a major role in reducing 
the consumption correlation puzzle in either high- or low- trade-cost countries. 
In Tables 2–7, it is noticeable that when an additional control is included (that is, 
the inclusion of an interaction term between the main independent variable and log 
distance from the US), the main independent variable often becomes insignificant 
and/or negative. As log distance is a measure of trade costs, this could be viewed 
as suggesting that with a richer or more complete set of measures of trade costs, 
the apparent puzzles can be explained. 
One potential concern with the above results is that the interaction term may just 
be capturing a trend decline in the puzzle over time (as trade costs have tended to 
decline over time). The inclusion of an additional interaction term between a time 
trend and the main independent variable provides mixed evidence on this (results 
not shown). The interaction term between trade costs and the main independent 
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variable remains positive for the investment and log real exchange rate equation, 
while it becomes negative for some specifications of the consumption equation.24 
Table 7: Consumption Smoothing – Equation (4) 
PPP measure (excluding government spending) – country and year fixed effects 
 Trade-cost 
measure 
Specification  Output  Interaction term  Trade  
cost 






2 Without  trade 
costs 
Baseline specification  0.74* 
(0.04) 
na na 






4  With duties  Weighted by population  0.88  0.0005  –0.006 
5  With duties  Weighted by GDP  0.88  0.0042  –0.042 





















































Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 588 observations used to estimate the 
results in the first row. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. PPP regressions include year 
fixed effects which effectively controls for the level of ‘world’ output despite a world output measure 
being unavailable. ‘na’ signifies no available estimate either because the terms are not included in the 
regression or because the variable is co-linear with the fixed effects.  
(a) Additional control is log distance interacted with the main independent variable. 
(b) Calculated using Stata’s rreg command. 
(c) Based on Stock-Yogo critical values, the instruments are not weak. 
                                           
24 Some analysis I conducted including developing countries provides less evidence that trade 
costs play a role in the puzzles, though there was some evidence for the investment equation. 
This may be because, for these countries, my proxy for trade costs less accurately reflects true 
trade costs. 
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4.  Capital Controls 
Another potential explanation for the three puzzles could be capital-market 
restrictions. Lewis (1996) argued that such restrictions could explain the lack of 
consumption risk sharing and Engel (2000) suggests that many of the puzzles may 
be explained by allowing for financial market imperfections. The following 
regression explores whether capital-market restrictions could play a role together 































1 4 3 2
1 1 1 1 1
+ + + +
+ + + + =
ϖ ϖ ϖ
ϖ θ γ φ δ
 (5) 
where K is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a country has capital controls and 
zero otherwise (based on IMF data). If the puzzle is due to an interaction of the 
role of trade costs and capital controls, then the relevant interaction coefficient, 
3 ϖ , will be positive. As can be seen from Table 1, many countries removed capital 
controls during the sample period, with around 80 per cent of observations having 
capital controls early in the sample but only about 10 per cent having it towards  
the end. 
Table 8 presents the results of investment, the real exchange rate and consumption 
equations using a variety of specifications. The middle column reports the 
coefficient  3 ϖ  in Equation (5) or its analogue, while the last column reports the 
coefficient  1 γ  or its analogue. The coefficient φ on the main independent variable 
(saving, the lag of the real exchange rate or output) appears in the left-hand column 
and tends to be positive and significant, suggesting that a puzzle still exists even 
after controlling for trade costs and capital controls. The coefficient  1 γ  is still 
positive, indicating that even in the absence of capital controls, trade costs still 




Table 8: Trade Costs, Capital Controls and the Puzzles 




exchange rate  
or output) 
Interaction of  
capital control, trade 
cost and main 
independent variable 
Interaction of trade 
cost and main 
independent variable












































































Consumption (PWT) country 








Consumption (PWT) country 








Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 568 observations are used to estimate the investment 
equations, 519 the exchange rate equations and 568 the consumption equations. * indicates significance 
at the 5 per cent level.  
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5.  Further Robustness Checks 
In this section I examine a number of further checks of the robustness of my 
results. First I use a different measure of trade costs obtained by running the 
following regression: 
  kit is k kit f ε β α + + =  (6) 
where fkit captures the average transport costs for shipments of good k to the US 
originating in country i at time t. Here, goods are disaggregated to the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 2, 3-digit level (again using 
Feenstra 2005). The betas are allowed to vary across countries and decades (which 
are indicated with the subscript s) and provide estimates of the transport costs for 
each country over time. 
The regression attributes some of the trade cost to a commodity-specific effect (as 
some goods are likely to be more expensive to transport than others) while 
allowing there to be an effect that varies across time and across countries 
(represented by the betas), which captures in some sense the underlying transaction 
costs for the country. While this is a direct and intuitive way of attempting to 
calculate transportation costs, there are a number of reasons why it may be 
problematic. For example, it assumes a specific, though not implausible, 
assumption about functional form. However, Appendix B provides some evidence 
that this trade-cost measure may be reasonable. 
The results from using estimates of betas as an alternative measure of trade costs in 
Equations (1) to (4) are reported in Table 9. The table provides support for trade 
costs explaining all three puzzles, since the interaction term is of the right sign in 
all specifications and similar in magnitude to estimates provided in Section 3 of the 
paper. Similar results are obtained if trade costs are assumed to follow a country-
specific trend. 
Up to this point I have been using trade-cost measures with the US as the proxy for 
general trade costs (largely due to data availability and reliability). There are a 
number of ways I attempt to assess whether this is likely to be affecting my results. 
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Table 9: Trade Costs and Macro Puzzles 
Alternative approach to measuring trade costs, including duties 
Model Main  independent 
variable (saving, 





Investment –0.03  0.03  Country 
Investment –0.02  0.05  Decade-country 
Log(real exchange rate)  0.79  0.007  None 
Log(real exchange rate)  0.75  0.010  Decade 
Consumption (including 
government spending) 
0.61 0.004  Country 
Consumption (excluding 
government spending) 
0.59 0.006  Country 
Consumption (PPP) (excluding 
government spending) 
0.60  0.011  Country and year
Consumption (PPP) (including 
government spending) 
0.35  0.02  Country and year
 
First, it is possible that by using trade costs with the US I may be able to describe 
well countries that are significant trading partners with the US, but poorly describe 
other countries. To assess this I run some of the simpler regressions using only a 
sub-sample of countries that trade substantially with the US – Australia, Canada, 
Japan and New Zealand (Table 10).25 Compared to the whole sample, arguably 
this sample suggests that trade costs provide a less convincing explanation for the 
puzzles; for the investment equation the interaction coefficient is insignificant and 
for one of the consumption equations it is negative. Alternatively, estimating the 
same regressions without these countries that trade highly with the US (that is, 
estimating for the European economies which tend to trade more amongst 
themselves) leads to results somewhat consistent with those of the full sample – the 
interaction term in the investment and the consumption (PPP) equations are 
positive and significant and the interaction term in the consumption (exchange 
rate) equation is also positive. However, the interaction term in the real exchange 
rate equation is negative and insignificant. This provides some evidence about the 
extent to which the main results are being driven by countries that trade 
substantially with the US. 
                                           
25 These countries have 20 per cent or more of their developed economy trade with the US 
(based on IMF DOTS for 1999). 
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Table 10: Trade Costs and Macro Puzzles 
Countries that trade substantially with the US; trade costs include duties 
Model Main  independent 
variable (saving, 





















































Notes:  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Country 
sample: Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand.  
 
As a second way to assess whether my results may be affected by their reliance on 
US import costs, I examine whether the extent of trade (as a share of GDP), in 
place of trade costs, effects the qualitative results. The idea behind this approach is 
that higher trade costs are likely to be reflected in lower openness and so openness 
may be a good and more broadly based indicator of trade costs. Moreover, it may 
also be better able to capture the extent of non-tradables, which are likely to lead to 
deviations between prices faced by locals and foreigners. Table 11 provides some 
further support to trade costs explaining part of the puzzles. The results indicate 





Table 11: Openness and Macro Puzzles 
Model Main  independent 
variable (saving, 





















































Notes:  Trade-cost measure includes duties for all specifications. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Openness measure is openness (exports plus imports all 
over GDP) in constant prices from Penn World Table. 
 
6.  What Aspects of the Puzzles Do the Trade Costs Explain? 
The above results suggest that it is possible to find some evidence that trade costs 
are associated with correlations that have been linked with three puzzles in 
international macroeconomics. Important issues are: (a) whether trade costs appear 
to explain much of these correlations; and (b) whether there are only certain 
aspects of the correlations that trade costs explain. 
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The first issue can be addressed by comparing the coefficient on the main 
independent variable in the models with and without trade-cost controls. The 
correlation (or more precisely the regression coefficient) between saving and 
investment in the data (controlling only for fixed effects) is 0.44, but the results 
suggest that after also controlling for trade costs, this correlation falls to 0.19. This 
suggests that trade costs can account for about half of the puzzle. For the real 
exchange rate, the estimates suggest that accounting for trade costs can reduce the 
correlation with the lagged real exchange rate from about 0.9 to 0.8. The 
coefficient estimates imply that if trade costs were to fall to zero, the half-life of 
shocks to the real exchange rate would fall from about five to three years. So, for 
the Feldstein-Horioka and PPP puzzles, trade costs appear to explain around half of 
the puzzles. Trade costs appear to explain little of the consumption correlation 
puzzle with the preferred specification suggesting that accounting for trade costs 
has no effect on the correlation between a country’s relative consumption and its 
relative output, with the correlation remaining stable at about 0.7 for the exchange 
rate measure. 
Table 12 provides information for addressing whether there are only certain 
aspects of the correlations that trade costs explain by summarising results for 
different controls. It can be seen that while trade costs play a role in some 
specifications, they play a minimal role in others. For example, in cross-sectional 
regressions of investment on saving (similar to the original specification of 
Feldstein-Horioka), including trade-cost controls increases the extent of the puzzle. 
This provides further evidence that trade costs are unlikely to be a complete 
explanation of the puzzles. However, to the extent that theory suggests that other 
factors are likely to contribute to the correlation, this may not be surprising. For 
example, cross-country differences in financial systems and developments may 






Table 12: Aspect of Puzzles and Trade Costs 
Dependent variable  Sign and significance 
of interaction term 




Investment Negative  na  Cross-section 
Investment Positive  significant  0.2  Panel  (none) 
Investment Positive  significant  0.6  Panel  (country) 
Investment Positive  significant  0.4  Panel   
(country-decade) 
Investment  Positive significant  0.3  Panel (country year)
Log(real exchange rate)  Positive insignificant  0.4  Panel (none) 
Log(real exchange rate)  Positive insignificant  0.4  Panel (decade) 
Log(real exchange rate)  Positive insignificant  0.4  Panel (year) 
Log(real exchange rate) 
Monthly data 
Positive insignificant  0.3  Panel (country) 
Log(real exchange rate) 
Bilateral quarterly data 
Negative na  Panel  (country) 
Log(real exchange rate) 
Imbs et al monthly data 
Negative na  Mean  group 
estimator 
Consumption Positive  insignificant  0.0  Panel  (country) 
Consumption  Negative   na  Panel  
(country-decade) 
Consumption  Positive significant  0.0  Panel (country year)
Consumption (excluding 
government spending) 
Positive insignificant  0.0  Panel (country) 
Consumption (PPP)  Positive insignificant  0.0  Panel (country year)
Consumption (PPP) (including 
government spending) 
Positive insignificant  na  Panel (country year)
Notes:  Fraction explained is based on difference between coefficients or implied real exchange rate half-life.
‘na’ is reported where the interaction term is negative or if coefficient with trade controls is larger than 
without. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Using panel data for a set of developed economies, this paper summarises the link 
between trade costs and three important puzzles in international macroeconomics. 
It provides evidence that the Feldstein-Horioka saving-investment puzzle and the 
PPP puzzle are partially explained by trade costs. The signs of coefficient estimates 
imply that higher trade costs are associated with a stronger relationship between 
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investment and savings and a more persistent exchange rate. The size of the 
coefficients implies that these effects are economically important, with trade costs 
accounting for something like half of each puzzle. However, the relationship is 
generally statistically significant only for the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. While 
there is some evidence for a link between trade costs and the consumption 
correlation puzzle, it is more mixed and trade costs appear to explain little of   
this puzzle. 
Additional analysis suggests that the effect of trade costs is somewhat robust to the 
inclusion of measures of capital controls in the regressions. Also, it is worth noting 
that the trade-cost measure used here is likely to be an imperfect measure of actual 
trade costs and so this approach may understate the relationship between these 
puzzles and trade costs. 
It is important to recognise that, at best, trade costs appear to only explain certain 
aspects of the puzzles or correlation. Moreover, as there is little evidence of trade 
costs explaining the consumption correlation puzzle and arguably fragile evidence 
of it explaining the PPP puzzle, more work needs to be done to understand how 
trade costs relate to these puzzles. One plausible argument is that all three puzzles 
should be linked because they are in some sense connected to issues of financial 
market imperfections. The developing theoretical literature on trade costs and some 
of the other puzzles in international macroeconomics (such as Coeurdacier 2006) 
may provide further insights into the nature of the relationships and how to better 
understand them empirically. 
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Appendix A: Notes on Data 
The following variables were used in the analysis: 
1.  Final consumption expenditure (2000 US$, converted using exchange rates) 
from World Development Indicators (World Bank) (transformed into per capita 
terms using GDP and GDP per capita data). This includes household final and 
general government final consumption expenditure. Tables 5 and 6 each include 
a regression which includes the statistical discrepancy in the consumption 
measure. 
2.  GDP per capita (2000 US$, converted using exchange rates) from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank). 
3.  Investment (gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP) from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank). 
4.  Real effective exchange rate (value in 2000 indexed to be 100) from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank). Available from 1975. Because of this 
and the regressions including the lagged real exchange rate, the analysis for this 
is limited to 1976–2001. 
5.  Saving (gross domestic saving as a percentage of GDP) from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank). 
6.  Trade-cost data: US imports FAS, CIF and duties by SITC 5-digit code, country 
and year from 1974 to 2001 from <http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/sasstata/ 
usiss.html>. The data have been aggregated to the 3-digit level. For all of the 
analysis I have dropped problematic observations such as where trade costs or 
FAS costs are negative. FAS cost is measured by the custom value.   
Before 1989, the FAS (customs value) and CIF numbers are reported directly. 
After 1988, the CIF numbers are calculated as the sum of FAS and charges. 
Trade costs without duties are the percentage CIF is above FAS. Trade costs 
with duties include duties as well. The percentages are approximated using the 
natural log function. Note that similar trade-cost data are not available for   
US exports. FAS cost does not include loading costs while FOB cost does. 
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7.  Trade-related data from Glick and Rose (2002). This included information 
about distance and geography used in some of the analysis. These data are 
available from Rose’s website (<http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/>).  
Glick and Rose’s data are only available up to 1997. 
8.  Capital restrictions data from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Data for Switzerland are not 
available over the whole sample. 
9.  Penn World Table versions of consumption and output. Output is real GDP per 
capita (Layspeyres) in 2000 constant prices and consumption is derived from 
consumption share for this series. These measures are in PPP. 
In addition, some analysis used demographic and real GDP data from the World 
Development Indicators (such as the last row of Table 2, where some observations 
were lost in calculating GDP growth as a proxy for productivity). Also, some 
analysis used bilateral (with respect to the US) real exchange rates based on data 
used by Imbs et al (2005), and bilateral real exchange rates with respect to the US, 
calculated from national sources. 
The analysis is for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (the 
United States is not part of our sample as it is not covered by United States import 
data). Note that because of data availability, the sample varies somewhat across 
regressions. Because the Glick and Rose data do not include data after 1997, the 
coverage of information on bilateral trade and free trade agreements is more 
limited in the more recent sample. Also, the Glick and Rose data are not 
comprehensive (for example, it has few observations for Belgium). However, it is 
unclear how this would bias the results and it seems likely that the Glick and Rose 
data should be relatively comprehensive given the available data sources. 
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Appendix B: Plausibility of Alternative Trade-cost Measure 
One way of checking the plausibility of the trade-cost estimates derived using 
equation (6) is to regress the beta estimates on distance and time and other 
variables that affect trade costs. The coefficient on distance from the US is 
expected to be positive. Another check is to see whether trade costs explain the 
extent of trade by running the regression: 
  it it is USit e X Trade 5 5 5 ) log( + + + = κ β γ δ  (B1) 
where TradeUSit is bilateral trade between the US and country i at time t (from 
Glick and Rose 2002), X are the possibly relevant controls in gravity models (like 
distance and other terms capturing geography). If the betas are only capturing trade 
costs, it would be expected that the coefficient on the second term would   
be negative. 
Figure B1 suggests that the estimated betas are generally similar to the more 
standard direct measure of trade costs. Table B1 provides further evidence that the 
betas plausibly capture trade costs. Panel  A reports a large positive correlation 
between the direct measure of trade cost and the calculated estimate. It also reports 
a positive and significant relationship between the estimated beta and an 
observable related to trade costs (distance from the US). Panel B reports 
coefficients from a regression of the betas from Equation (6) on a range of 
variables common to gravity models of trade. It indicates that distance for the US 
and being an island is associated with higher betas, and a regional trade agreement 
(with the US) and having a common border (with the US) reduces beta. Sharing a 
common language with the US (i.e., speaking English) does not seem to have an 
effect on beta. Panel C indicates that the estimated betas are negatively related to 
the extent of trade with the US. (The results in Tables 9 and B1 are generally 
robust to the two potential outliers which can be seen in Figure B1.) 
In summary, Figure B1 and Table B1 suggest that there is a reasonable relationship 
between the fitted measures of trade cost (beta) with both the actual money trade 
cost used in Section 3 and factors related to trade with the US, suggesting the betas 
are at least capturing factors related to US trade costs. To the extent that the US is 
a significant country in the world economy, trade costs with the US may be a good 
indicator of overall trade costs. 
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Table B1: Trade Costs and Betas 
  Trade cost with duty 
Panel A   
Correlation between trade costs and betas  0.69 
Coefficient from regressing beta on log of bilateral distance  5.4* 
(0.4) 
Panel B   
Regression of beta on multiple variables   
Log distance  1.7 
(0.9) 
Common border  –5.4* 
(1.1) 
Island  1.5* 
(0.5) 
Land-locked  –1.1* 
(0.3) 
Common language  0.1 
(0.3) 
Regional trade agreement  –2.6* 
(0.5) 
Panel C   
Coefficient from regressing log(bilateral trade) on beta  –0.26 
Coefficient from regressing log(bilateral trade) on beta
(a) –0.78 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first-stage regression (Equation (5)) was estimated using 113
580 observations (where an observation is a country-year-commodity type). The correlation in the top 
cell was calculated from 588 observations (where an observation is a country-year). * indicates 
significance at the 5 per cent level. 
(a) Additional controls are whether share border, whether an island, whether land-locked, whether share 
a common language, whether in a regional trade agreement, log distance, ‘decade’ dummies and the 
interaction between decade dummies and log distance. 
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